Abstract
Demarcating science from nonscience became a hot topic in the wake of Judge Overton's opinion in McLean v. Arkansas (1982). The ensuing discussion by philosophers of science Larry Laudan and Michael Ruse provides an instructive example of how not to solve the problems of demarcating science from nonscience. Overton follows Ruse in viewing demarcation through Popperian falsificationism, which would unfortunately render much of what we call "science" nonscientific. Laudan's response is to jettison the possibility of demarcation and simply accept Young Earth Creationism as a science, albeit a bad one. One result is how the case reveals a chasm between those who automatically debunk the potential legitimacy of supernatural causation and those who do not - even among naturalists! As a result, I use the Overton decision as a springboard for the advocacy of a terminological change in the debate over naturalism and demarcation, one which renders the nature of the disputes more perspicuous. I suggest that we divide the sciences by their causal-explanatory structure, and, in particular, by their ability to abstract from the causal power of agency (whether human or divine) in their proper explanations. The sciences are thus demarcated into the teleological and the nonteleological, rather than the more usual division between "social" and natural. Once this is understood, it is clear that the nonteleological sciences forego, in principle, any possibility of supernatural causation in their proper explanations, and hence leave no room for most interesting varieties of theism. If we take these sciences and their methods as constitutive of "naturalism," then it can be sharply demarcated from theism. However, if teleological sciences are taken seriously (e.g., biology!), then science and nonscience must be demarcated carefully, by appealing to the values inherent in good scientific explanations, rather than their rejection of teleology.